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运用欧洲复兴与开发银行(EBRD)在转型经济国家进行的BEEPS调查数据,本文研究了转型经济中企业增长与贿赂的关系。控制了企业、行业、制度和宏观经济的相关因素,以及控制了遗漏企业隐含特征所造成的内生性问题后,发现企业的贿赂与增长间存在显著的正向关系。进一步的研究表明贿赂能够通过降低官员掠夺(“保护费”功能),或帮助企业获得资源(“润滑剂”功能)来促进企业增长,这体现了贿赂的“关系资本”作用。
Using data from the BEEPS survey conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in transitional economies, this paper examines the relationship between corporate growth and bribery in a transitional economy. After controlling the related factors of enterprises, industries, institutions and macroeconomics, and controlling the endogenous problems caused by the hidden features of missing companies, it is found that there is a significant positive relationship between corporate bribery and growth. Further research shows that bribery can promote business growth by reducing official plunder (“protection costs”), or by helping businesses get resources (“lubricants”), reflecting the bribery of “relational capital” effect.