论文部分内容阅读
This paper proposes a new solution to the well-known Free Choice Permission Paradoxes[4,12,34],combining ideas from substructural logics and nonmonotonic reasoning.Free choice permission is intuitively understood as "ff it is permitted to do α or β then it is permitted to do α and it is permitted to do β." Yet one of its logically equivalent form allows the following inference which seems clearly unacceptable: if it is permitted to order a vegetarian lunch then it is permitted to order a vegetarian lunch and not pay for it[12].The challenge for a logic of free choice permission is to exclude such counter-intuitive consequences while not giving up too much deductive power.We suggest that the right way to do so is using a family of substructural logics augmented with a principle borrowed from non-monotonic reasoning.This follows up on a proposal made in[1].