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随着中国经济和资本市场的发展,以及法规的不断健全,中国企业逐渐学会通过运用与实施并购战略发展壮大。本文着重分析并购中的代理问题,从企业内代理问题改善的角度出发,通过对相关理论的回顾和分析,提出企业并购中可能出现两类代理问题:第一,目标企业管理层与股东之间的代理问题;第二,并购前后目标企业大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题。本文运用了实证研究的方法,以2006～2007年发生并购事件的我国上市公司为研究对象,经过样本选择,提出理论假设,建立模型,进行定量分析,利用SPSS软件,运用回归分析的方法得出结论:由并购带来的目标企业代理成本的降低,会提升并购绩效。受报表性并购等因素的影响,检验结果与理论假设并不完全一致。针对出现的问题,作者对今后研究中的理论和方法改进做了展望。
With the development of China’s economy and capital markets and the continuous improvement of laws and regulations, Chinese enterprises have gradually learned to grow and develop through the application and implementation of mergers and acquisitions. This article focuses on the analysis of agency problems in M & A. From the point of view of the improvement of agency problems in the enterprise, through the review and analysis of relevant theories, it is proposed that there may be two types of agency problems in M & A: first, between target company management and shareholders Of the agency problem; second, before and after the merger and acquisition target shareholders and small shareholders between the agency problem. This article uses the empirical research method to take the listed companies in our country which take place in M & A events from 2006 to 2007 as the research object. Through the sample selection, the paper puts forward the theoretical hypothesis, establishes the model, carries on the quantitative analysis, uses the SPSS software and the regression analysis method Conclusion: The reduction of the agency cost of the target company caused by M & A will enhance M & A performance. Due to the impact of reporting mergers and acquisitions and other factors, the test results are not completely consistent with the theoretical assumptions. In view of the problems that appear, the author makes a prospect on the improvement of theory and method in the future research.