A recent wave of reforms across Eastern European countries gave more fiexibility and in formation for parties to engage in secured debt transactions,also reducing court involvement.Critically,the menu of assets accepted as pledges in secured transactions was increased to include "movable assets"(e.g.,machinery and equipment).Contrasting firms operating in industries with differential use of movable and immovable assets,difference-in-differences tests show that firms operating more movable assets borrowed more,invested more,hired more,and became more efficient and profitable following those changes in contracting.The reforms also democra tized access to credit,with more firms(particularly small ones)abandoning their zero-leverage status.Notably,results are modulated by the level of efficiency of local courts,with larger credit expansion taking place in jurisdictions where courts were previously less efficient.The financial deepening we document triggered important capital and employment reallocation effects: Firms whose assets are most sensitive to the reform observe a sharp increase in their share of capital stock and employment in the economy.