通过构建博弈模型,分析渠道权利在制造商主导背景下的一致定价策略对双渠道冲突的作用,研究显示在此前背景下的一致定价策略并不能有效缓解渠道冲突问题,并通过Levi’s、苹果公司的两个案例对模型结果进行了验证,提出制造企业应改变原来打造电商团队与传统分销渠道争利的策略,转向利用互联网推广产品来增加市场总量增长的策略建议。 By constructing a game model, this paper analyzes the role of the channel pricing strategy in the context of the manufacturer-led conflict on the dual-channel conflict. The research shows that the consistent pricing strategy in the previous context can not effectively mitigate the channel conflict problem. Through Levi’s, Two cases verify the results of the model. It is suggested that manufacturing enterprises should change their original strategy of creating e-commerce teams and compete with traditional distribution channels, and turn to strategies to increase the total market by using Internet to promote products.