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本文针对实施半强制性分红政策后,再融资上市公司与非再融资上市公司现金流的变化情况,分析了半强制分红政策对上市公司操控经营活动现金流的影响。研究表明,在我国证监会的强制要求下,上市公司分红比例与再融资资格挂钩后,相比非再融资上市公司,再融资上市公司更具有操控现金流的动机。进一步研究发现,再融资上市公司操控经营活动现金流的时期集中在半强制分红措施颁布实施后,这种现金流操控现象最终可导致公司价值和投资者利益受到损害。
This paper analyzes the impact of semi-mandatory dividend policy on the cash flow of listed companies controlling operating activities in light of the changes of cash flow of refinancing listed companies and non-refinancing listed companies after the implementation of semi-mandatory dividend policy. Research shows that under the mandatory requirement of China’s CSRC, after the proportion of dividends paid by listed companies is linked with the refinancing qualifications, the refinancing listed companies are more motivated to manipulate cash flow than non-refinancing listed companies. Further study found that the refinancing of listed companies to control the cash flow of operating activities focused on semi-mandatory bonus measures promulgated and implemented, this cash flow manipulation can eventually lead to corporate value and investor interests have been harmed.