论文部分内容阅读
境外上市可通过令企业接受更严格的法律和监管环境约束,来强化投资者保护、促进公司治理。其他传统公司治理机制对中国国企的效用相对有限,境外上市之价值与可操作性尤其值得重视。但境外上市并非万能。不少境外上市的明星国企出现严重的治理危机,与国企固有的缺陷大有关联。境外监管者对中国国企特殊身份的顾虑亦可能会导致放松监督。境外上市导致的企业知名度的增加则可能诱使政府虑及国企倒闭产生的影响,而以高代价保出受困企业,形成对其他国企的隐性担保。这会降低境外投资者和监管者对国企的事前监督激励,减损境外上市的预设功能。故国企治理的根本提高最终有赖于政府更明确地界定自身在企业中的定位。
Overseas listings can strengthen investor protection and promote corporate governance by allowing companies to adopt more stringent legal and regulatory environmental constraints. Other traditional corporate governance mechanisms have relatively limited utility on China’s state-owned enterprises. The value and maneuverability of overseas listing deserve particular attention. However, overseas listing is not a panacea. Many listed overseas star-listed SOEs experienced a serious crisis of governance and were greatly linked to the flaws inherent in state-owned enterprises. Foreign regulators’ concerns about the special status of Chinese SOEs may also lead to loosen supervision. The increase in corporate reputation caused by overseas listing may induce the government to consider the impact of the collapse of state-owned enterprises and keep the distressed enterprises at a high price to form a hidden guarantee for other state-owned enterprises. This will reduce the prior supervision and encouragement of state-owned enterprises by overseas investors and regulators and detract from the pre-planned functions of overseas listing. Therefore, the fundamental improvement of the management of state-owned enterprises ultimately depends on the government more clearly define their own position in the enterprise.