本文运用博弈理论和制度经济学相结合的方法 ,分析了国际贸易中国家政策选择的困境 ,对于静态、动态和无限重复博弈条件下的各种战略均衡的成因和路径进行了阐释 ,并且利用对于局中人的制度基础的观察降低了白噪声在模型中增加的不确定性 ,使得博弈方可以精确地判别对手的类型 ,利用对于欺骗战略的威胁承诺来保证合作均衡的实现。 This paper analyzes the predicament of the choice of national policies in international trade by using the combination of game theory and institutional economics, explains the causes and paths of various strategic equilibria under static, dynamic and infinitely repeated games, Observations on the institutional basis of the bureau reduce the uncertainty of the white noise added to the model so that the game side can accurately determine the type of opponent and use the promise of commitment to deceive the strategy to ensure the achievement of a balanced cooperation.