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本文基于我国上市公司的样本数据,考察管理层股权激励薪酬契约机制对公司风险承担的影响,并利用股改提供的“自然实验”条件,检验大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突如何影响管理层股权激励的治理效果。研究发现,管理层股权激励对公司的风险承担水平产生了重要影响,授予管理层的股权激励越强,公司的风险承担水平越低。股权分置改革显著地减弱了管理层股权激励对公司风险承担的负面效应,二者的关系在股改完成后不再显著。上述结果表明,基于股权的薪酬契约强化了管理者个人财富对公司业绩的敏感性,风险厌恶的管理者倾向于降低公司的风险承担以化解个人财富的分散化风险,而大股东治理机制的改善有助于约束管理者的卸责行为,降低股权激励对公司风险承担的负面影响。
Based on the sample data of the listed companies in our country, this paper examines the impact of the management incentive mechanism of equity incentive compensation on the company’s risk appetite and uses the “natural experiment” condition provided by the stock reform to test how the conflicts of interest between the major shareholders and minority shareholders affect Governance Effect of Stock Ownership Incentives. The study found that the management equity incentive has a significant impact on the company’s risk-taking level, the stronger the equity incentive granted to management, the lower the level of risk-taking companies. The split share structure reform significantly weakened the negative effect of management equity incentive on corporate risk exposure, and the relationship between the two was no longer significant after the share reform was completed. The above results show that the equity-based remuneration contract enhances the manager’s personal wealth sensitivity to the performance of the company. Risk-averse managers tend to reduce the risk-taking of the company in order to reduce the risk of decentralization of personal wealth, while the improvement of the governance mechanism of the major shareholder It helps to restrain management’s liability avoidance and reduce the negative impact of equity incentive on corporate risk appetite.