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检验了高管变更与上市公司表现之间的关系,得到了两个结果。第一个结果是当公司处于亏损时,高管变更前公司的盈利能力与高管变更之间呈负相关关系。但是,公司处于盈利时却没有这样的关系。第二个结果是,亏损公司在高管变更后的盈利能力有所提升,但是同样对于盈利的公司却没有这样的一个提升。这些结果表明存在一个随时间变化的目标,在这个目标下,亏损的公司的股东比盈利的公司的股东更有一个以公司的财务表现去约束管理层的动机。
Examined the relationship between executive change and the performance of listed companies, and got two results. The first result is a negative correlation between the company’s profitability and executive change before the change of the company when the company is losing money. However, the company does not have such a relationship when it is profitable. The second result is that loss-making companies have improved their profitability after executives change, but there has been no such improvement for profit-making companies. These results show that there is a time-varying goal under which shareholders of loser companies have a motivation to constrain management with the company’s financial performance than shareholders of the profitable company.