在目前我国对内幕信息受领人的内幕交易处罚中,证券监管机构对内幕信息受领人是否知悉内幕信息的认定往往采取推定方式。在相当一部分案件中,只要能证明被处罚人曾与内部人有过接触,并在此后交易了相关证券,便基本推定被处罚人在与内部人的联络中获知了内幕信息,从而认定其构成内幕交易行为。这种事实推定的方式一定程度上背离“明显优势证明标准”。借鉴美国的经验,本文认为,认定内幕信息受领人的内幕交易责任,还需考量其与内部人之间是否有实质意义的紧密关系以作为间接证据。同时,证券监管机构还应总结其他应考量的因素,以避免推定事实的危险。 At present, China’s punishment of insider trading of insider information recipients, securities regulators often adopt the presumption that the insider information recipients know the insider information. In a considerable number of cases, as long as it can be proved that the punished person had had contact with insiders and subsequently dealt in the relevant securities, it was basically presumed that the punished was informed of the inside information in connection with the insider, Insider Trading. The fact that such a way of presumption deviates to some extent from the “clear evidence of superiority”. Learning from the experience of the United States, this paper argues that the determination of the insider trading liability of the insider information recipients also needs to consider whether there is any substantive close relationship with insiders as indirect evidence. At the same time, the securities regulator should also summarize other factors that should be considered in order to avoid the risk of presumptive facts.