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哈贝马斯提到如果把第一人权转入实在法,要实现已经刻写在人类集体记忆中的严格的道德要求,就会产生一种法律义务。作者认为要解读这一观点,需要借助康德哲学中的一个要素,即实行强制性法律秩序的道德义务。通过对哈贝马斯的上述观点及康德理论结构的分析,特别是对人的尊严和天赋权利概念的比较研究,作者论证了哈贝马斯的人的尊严概念相当于康德的天赋权利概念,它们都构成了人权的基础。由于二者对人权以及法律的强制性有着共同的认识,所以在哈贝马斯的交往理论中能再次形成康德的论证结构,即以道德为基础的权利义务。作者认为正是这种义务构成了现存的和未来的法律秩序的基础,并进而提出了所有行为者都有促进以人权为基础的全球法律秩序的义务。
Habermas mentioned that a legal obligation would arise if the first human rights were to be transferred to substantive law and the strict moral requirements that had been carved into human collective memory had been realized. The author believes that to interpret this view, we need to use one of the elements of Kant’s philosophy, that is, the moral obligation of enforcing a mandatory legal order. Through the analysis of Habermas’s theory and Kant’s theoretical structure, especially the comparative study of human dignity and natural rights, the author demonstrates that Habermas’s concept of human dignity is equivalent to Kant’s concept of natural rights, They all form the basis of human rights. Because both have a common understanding of human rights and the coerciveness of law, Kant’s argumentation structure, the moral rights and obligations, can once again be formed in Habermas’s communicative theory. The author believes that it is the obligation that forms the basis of the present and future legal order and, in turn, the obligation of all actors to promote a global legal order based on human rights.