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近年来我国品牌企业因其上游产品质量安全问题等,食品安全事件频繁被曝光,加剧了我国食品安全信任危机。本文利用声誉机制和规制理论,分析了品牌企业基于自身声誉作出的食品安全相关的生产检测等控制决策及其相应的政府监管机制。研究表明:在对未来经营出现食品安全问题具有乐观预期的“无限期”经营企业与持有谨慎态度的“有限期”经营企业对产品质量安全的检测水平,受到消费者对食品安全重视程度的正向影响、检测控制成本和食品价格的负向影响等。并且从供给推动与需求拉动两方面分析了对应的政府监管机制。
In recent years, China’s brand enterprises because of its upstream product quality and safety issues, frequent exposure to food safety incidents, aggravating the crisis of confidence in China’s food safety. Based on reputation and regulatory theory, this paper analyzes the control decisions of food safety-related production testing and other related government regulatory mechanisms made by brand enterprises based on their own reputation. The research shows that the level of detection of product quality and safety of “indefinitely” operating companies and “cautious” companies with optimistic expectation on future food safety problems are affected by consumers’ The positive impact of safety emphasis, the detection and control of costs and the negative impact of food prices. And analyzes the corresponding government supervision mechanism from two aspects: supply promotion and demand pull.