论文部分内容阅读
电力市场环境下 ,电力公司与用户之间存在的信息不对称性可能会导致可中断负荷管理的低效。文中提出了一种激励相容的可中断负荷管理合同模型 ,可引导用户自愿披露真实缺电成本信息。该模型能考虑用户的最大可中断负荷限制 ,并能适用于负荷中断分配的不同优化目标 ,如电力公司利润最大或用户缺电成本最小等。采用蒙特卡洛模拟方法的算例表明了该模型的有效性。
In an electricity market environment, the asymmetric information that exists between power companies and users can lead to inefficient interruptible load management. In this paper, an incentive-compatible interruptible load management contract model is proposed, which can lead users to voluntarily disclose the real power shortage cost information. The model considers the user’s maximum interruptible load limit and can be adapted to different optimization objectives of load disruption distribution, such as the maximum profit of the power company or the minimum cost of the user’s power failure. An example using the Monte-Carlo simulation method shows the effectiveness of the model.