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论文通过实验对不完全信息条件下双主并方合作而目标企业善意配合的并购定价、并购持股、并购时机选择等并购策略进行了验证性研究。首先,基于现有理论成果和新兴的实验研究方法,提出了六条实验假设;其次,以单方善意并购情形为比较基准,分别对单方善意并购和双主并方合作善意并购情形下的角色扮演、实验变量、实验分组、实验流程、实验过程控制和支付函数进行了设置和界定,并通过实验参数的不同设置来刻画和区分不同的实验情形与实验分组;最后,通过计量统计研究发现,在不完全信息条件下,协同收益率、控制权溢价率与均衡的并购交易价格同向变化;协同收益率越高,谈判用时越短,控制权溢价率越高,谈判用时越长;信息越趋于完全,最佳并购时机越早到来;初始持股的“门槛效应”加速了最佳并购时机的到来;双主并方之间的合作联盟降低了并购成交价格;并购双方的合谋并不是导致并购市场资源配置效率降低的主导因素。
The thesis conducts a confirmatory research on the merger and acquisition pricing, M & A strategies of mergers and acquisitions, timing of mergers and acquisitions, and other merger strategies through the cooperation of both parties and parties under the condition of incomplete information. First of all, based on the existing theoretical results and emerging experimental research methods, six experimental hypotheses are proposed. Secondly, based on the unilateral goodwill mergers and acquisitions as the comparative standard, Experimental variables, experimental groupings, experimental procedures, experimental process control and payment functions were set and defined, and different experimental settings and experimental groups were used to characterize and distinguish different experimental situations and experimental groups. Finally, we found that Under the condition of complete information, the synergetic rate of return and the premium rate of control change in the same direction with the equilibrium price of M & A transactions. The higher the synergistic rate of return, the shorter the negotiation time, the higher the premium rate of control and the longer the negotiation time. Completely, the best time to merge the arrival of the best; the initial holding “threshold effect ” to accelerate the arrival of the best mergers and acquisitions; the cooperation between the two parties and the parties to reduce the transaction price of mergers and acquisitions; merger and acquisition of the two sides is not collusion Lead to the M & A market, the main factor in reducing the efficiency of resource allocation.