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本文根据十八大后落马市委书记截面数据,利用回归模型,对地方“一把手”腐败行为的影响进行检视和评估。研究发现:地方“一把手”廉洁与否直接影响任职地方的政治生态,具有腐败行为的“一把手”所任职的地方,其腐败程度更加严重;具有腐败行为的“一把手”在一个地方的任职工作年限对该地的腐败程度有着显著影响,任职时间越长,对当地领导干部的廉洁从政产生的恶劣影响越大。因此,为消减地方“一把手”腐败的影响,落实对地方“一把手”权力运行的有效制约和监督,在权力的“授予”与“监督”之间保持畅达、平衡和协调,必须建立健全决策权、执行权、监督权既相互制约又相互协调的权力结构和运行机制。
Based on the data of the secretary-general of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the post-18th CPC Central Committee, this paper examines and evaluates the impact of the “top leaders” on corruption by using regression models. The study found that local “leaders” have a direct impact on the political ecology of the place where they are engaged, and corruption is even more serious in the areas where they are employed by corrupt officials. Corrupt officials are at the The working years in a given place have a significant impact on the level of corruption in this place. The longer the term of office, the greater the adverse impact on the integrity and integrity of the local leading cadres. Therefore, in order to reduce the influence of the “top leaders” of local governments and implement effective checks and checks on the power running of the local “top leaders” and to maintain and maintain a balance between the “grant” and “supervision” of power And coordination, we must establish and improve a power structure and operational mechanism that both decision-making power, executive power and supervisory power restrict and coordinate with each other.