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市场经济取向的制度变革意味着政府、企业和个人在新的契约关系中重新定位。文章强调转型时期正式的契约难以在第三方约束下强制性执行的软约束特征，而导致契约软约束的基本原因在于转型时期混合式契约制度安排。即社会关系网络和权力作为非承诺性的“原始”契约和命令计划者大范围的或更深层次地与法律交织在一起，发挥作用。文章探讨了合约形态如何从计划时期的隐含式长期契约关系向市场经济的法律上可强制实施的合同关系的转变过程、契约软约束的形式、机会主义与多重成本特征、交易成本结构变化与契约选择间的关系。
Institutional changes in the direction of market economy mean that governments, enterprises and individuals are reoriented in the new contractual relationship. The paper emphasizes that the formal contract during the transition period is difficult to enforce under the constraint of the third party. The basic reason that leads to the contractual soft constraint lies in the arrangement of the hybrid contract system in the transitional period. That is, social networks and power are intertwined with law as a non-promiscuous “original” contract and command planner to a greater or lesser extent and play a role. The article discusses how the contract form changes from the implicit long-term contractual relationship in the planning period to the legally enforceable contractual relationship in the market economy, the form of soft contractual constraints, the characteristics of opportunism and multiple costs, the structural changes of transaction costs and Relationship between contract choices.