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本文试图为政治治理结构选择提供一个经济学解释。地方政府拥有资源的配置权,利益集团为了获得这项资源配置而去俘获地方政府,但这会造成社会收入不均加剧,从而给政府带来社会收入不均成本。中央政府可以通过任命制、有限选举制以及选举制三种不同的政治治理结构来规制地方政府的资源配置行为,从而最大化自身的利益。本文分析表明,在不同的环境下中央政府会选择不同的最优政治治理结构。从社会福利的角度看,此制度结构下政府的选择行为不一定是社会福利最优的。社会收入差距越大、政府对于私人收益的评价越低,政府越有可能接受社会的问责。
This article attempts to provide an economic explanation for the choice of political governance structure. Local governments have the right to dispose of resources, and interest groups capture local governments in order to obtain the allocation of resources. However, this will result in increasing social income inequality and thus bring about uneven social incomes to the government. The Central Government can regulate the allocation of resources by local governments through three different political governance structures: appointment system, limited election system and electoral system so as to maximize their own interests. The analysis of this paper shows that under different circumstances, the central government will choose different optimal political governance structures. From the point of view of social welfare, the choice of government under this institutional structure is not necessarily optimal for social welfare. The greater the social income gap, the lower the government’s assessment of private income, the more likely it is that the government will accept social accountability.