:经理股票期权通过赋予经营者一定的“剩余索取权”,使经营者的利益和投资者的利益紧密联系在一起 ,能相对有效地解决现代企业中委托——代理问题 ,避免经理人的“短期行为”与“道德风险”,从而得以在国外较为普遍地使用。随着我国资本市场、法律环境逐步完善 ,以及当前国企现代企业制度的建立和法人治理结构的完善 ,我们可以引入股票期权这种长期激励机制 ,使其与薪金、奖金等短期手段良好配合 ,来解决长期困扰我国国企的激励约束机制问题 : Managerial stock options give managers some “residual claims”, so that the interests of managers and investors are closely linked together, can be relatively effective in solving the problem of principal-agent in modern enterprises, to avoid the manager’s “ Short-term behavior ”and“ moral hazard ”, thus making it more generally available abroad. With the gradual improvement of the capital market and legal environment in our country, as well as the establishment of the modern enterprise system and the improvement of the corporate governance structure in the state-owned enterprises, we can introduce long-term incentive mechanisms such as stock options to make it work well with short-term means such as salaries and bonuses. To solve the long-standing problem that beset the incentive and restraint mechanism of China’s state-owned enterprises