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盈余管理是追求私人利益最大化的财务信息披露管理行为,盈余管理效率问题是会计理论界热点问题。基于公司治理结构构建委托代理关系盈余管理模型,我们发现:失衡公司治理结构下,盈余管理可能是机会主义或帕累托改进效率型盈余管理,只有在制衡公司治理结构下,盈余管理才能达到帕累托最优效率状态,这为治理盈余管理提供一个理论基础。
Earnings management is the financial information disclosure management that pursues the maximization of private interests. The efficiency of earnings management is a hot issue in the field of accounting theory. Based on the corporate governance structure to build the principal-agent relationship of earnings management model, we find that under the corporate governance imbalance, earnings management may be opportunism or Pareto improve the efficiency of earnings management, and only in the balance of corporate governance structure, earnings management can reach Pa Tired to optimize the efficiency of the state, which provides a theoretical basis for the management of earnings management.