本文回顾了最新的四本关于民主制中的效率的经济学著作。特别强调了两种野心勃勃的挑战性的研究方法 :曼库·奥尔森的包含利益理论和唐纳德·威特曼的“民主失败的神话”。本文论证了民主一般意味着高效的命题在很多方面是有问题的。用肤浅的经济学类比得出的概括性结论 ,抽走了民主政治的许多关键性特征 ,如信息不全、激励结构薄弱以及集体行动失败。取得高效结果的根本原因更多的是统治者在经济中赌注规模的大小 ,而不是自发的科斯式的交易。 This article reviews the latest four economic books on the efficiency of democracy. Two ambitious and challenging research approaches are highlighted: the Manuk Olsen theory of inclusive interests and Donald Wittman’s “Myth of Democracy Failure.” This article argues that in many ways, the proposition that democracy generally implies efficiency is problematic. The general conclusions drawn from superficial economic analogies have taken away many of the key features of democratic politics such as under-information, weak incentive structures and failure of collective action. The root cause of efficient outcomes is more the size of the ruler’s bets in the economy than the spontaneous Kos-type deals.