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当制造商和零售商之间同时存在销售和回收关系时,存在按照销售、回收活动各自单独激励与按照总收益整体激励两种契约类型,本文在信息对称与不对称两种情形下对这两种类型契约的激励机制差异进行研究,结果发现:在信息对称情形下,两种契约类型的均衡结果完全一致;在信息不对称情形下,对零售商而言,无论采取哪一种契约类型,其分成比例均更高,承担的风险也更大,但对制造商而言,按照销售、回收活动各自收益单独激励契约类型更优;从风险规避的角度看,在信息不对称情形下,制造商的确定性等价收益随零售商/制造商风险规避程度的增加而递减,零售商的确定性等价收益保持不变,但努力程度、销售量、回收量随制造商风险规避程度的增加而递增,随零售商风险规避程度的增加而递减,期望收益与制造商的期望收益呈反方向变化,进而导致供应链整体期望收益变化方向不确定。
When there is a relationship between sales and reclamation, there are two types of contract in accordance with the separate incentives of sales and recycling activities and the overall incentives according to the total revenue. In the two cases of information symmetry and asymmetry, The results show that the equilibrium results of the two contract types are exactly the same under the condition of symmetric information. In the case of asymmetric information, no matter what type of contract the retailer adopts, Its proportion is higher, the risk is also greater, but for manufacturers, in accordance with the sales, recycling activities separately incentive incentive contract types better; from the perspective of risk aversion, in the case of asymmetric information, manufacturing The deterministic equivalent returns of firms decrease with the increase of risk aversion of retailers / manufacturers, while the retailer’s deterministic equivalent returns remain unchanged, but the degree of effort, sales volume, and the amount of recovery depend on the manufacturer’s risk aversion While the increment decreases with the increasing degree of risk aversion of the retailer. The expected return and the expected return of the manufacturer change in the opposite direction, which leads to the whole supply chain period Earnings change direction uncertain.