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笔者以2007—2013年我国主板上市企业数据为研究样本,采用盈余反应系数衡量盈余质量,实证研究了不同CEO权力维度与CEO综合权力对盈余质量的影响,以及不同产品市场竞争环境下,CEO权力对盈余质量影响的变化。实证结果表明,在不同的产品市场竞争环境下,CEO权力对盈余质量的影响各不相同。在激烈的产品市场竞争环境中,CEO拥有的综合权力越大,盈余质量越好,任职年限长、学历水平高以及持有本企业股份的CEO能带来更好的盈余质量,两职兼任、董事会独立性以及董事会规模三个权力维度对盈余质量不具有显著影响。产品市场竞争较弱时,盈余质量与CEO综合权力以及不同CEO权力维度之间均不存在显著相关关系。研究结果表明,提高产品市场竞争程度,同时赋予CEO适当权力,能有效改善上市企业盈余质量。
Based on the data of China’s mainboard listed companies from 2007 to 2013, the author measures the earnings quality by using the earnings response coefficient, and empirically studies the influence of different CEO power dimensions and CEO’s comprehensive power on the earnings quality, as well as the power of CEO under the competitive environment of different products Impact on Earnings Quality Changes. Empirical results show that the influence of CEO power on earnings quality varies in different product market competition environments. In a fierce competition in the product market environment, CEOs have more comprehensive power, better earnings quality, longer tenure, higher academic qualifications, and CEOs holding shares in the company that can lead to better earnings quality. Board independence and board size The three dimensions of power have no significant effect on earnings quality. When product market competition is weak, there is no significant correlation between earnings quality and CEO comprehensive power and different CEO power dimensions. The results show that improving the market competition and giving the CEO the right power can effectively improve the earnings quality of listed companies.