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本文认为现实中的反倾销是一种具有不确定性的战略性进口贸易政策,并由此出发研究了反倾销政策对于寡头竞争企业的战略以及进口国和出口国双方福利的影响。与关税政策不同,由于反倾销税征收上不确定,企业可以通过提价来规避,它可能会造成进口国福利的损失;而进口国要通过反倾销政策改善福利,需要使得它难以被规避,这解释了现实中反倾销税的高幅度。这些结果与企业的竞争类型无关。同时本文还分析了面临反倾销税时出口国的最优出口战略性贸易政策。
This paper argues that anti-dumping in the real world is an uncertain strategic import trade policy. Based on this, we study the impact of anti-dumping policy on the strategy of oligopolistic firms and the welfare of both importing and exporting countries. Different from the tariff policy, due to the uncertainty of the collection of anti-dumping duties, the enterprise can avoid it by raising the price, which may result in the loss of the welfare of the importing country. The importing country needs to improve the welfare through the anti-dumping policy, making it difficult to be circumvented. This explains The actual high rate of anti-dumping duties. These results have nothing to do with the type of business competition. At the same time, this article also analyzes the optimal export strategic trade policy of exporting countries in the face of anti-dumping duties.