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本文研究当产品有差异度情况下寡头垄断市场中企业进行并购的利润和社会福利变化。在非合作完全信息静态博弈的假定下，分别使用Ｃｏｕｒｎｏｔ和Ｂｅｒｔｒａｎｄ均衡方法，探讨了企业能够通过兼并以增加利润的市场及产品特征。研究结果很好地解释了“优势互补”并购的利润动因，同时分析了这种并购方式对社会福利的影响。建议从全球福利最大化的角度来规制这种企业并购
This paper studies the changes in the profits and social benefits of mergers and acquisitions (M & A) in oligopolistic markets when the products have different degrees of differentiation. Under the assumption of non-cooperative complete information static game, we use Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium respectively to discuss the market and product characteristics that firms can increase profits through mergers. The results of the study well explained the motivation for the “complementary advantages” M & A, and analyzed the impact of such M & A on social welfare. It is advisable to regulate such mergers and acquisitions from the perspective of maximizing global welfare