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考虑一种具有网络效应特征的产品,本文研究当产品预期网络规模主要受质量影响时,双寡头企业如何进行质量竞争。本文建立了一个两阶段博弈模型的方法分析了这种问题。结果表明,市场领导者获得大于其预期网络规模的市场份额,而市场跟随者获得小于其预期网络规模的市场份额。对于弱网络效应产品,随着网络效应的增强,两企业的产品质量分化加剧,价格及利润差异随之扩大。当网络效应的强度足够低时,市场跟随者利用后发优势得到较大利润。而对于强网络效应产品,市场领导者利用先发优势得到更大利润。
Considering a product with network effect characteristics, this paper studies how duopoly firms compete for quality when the expected network size of the product is largely affected by quality. This paper establishes a two-stage game model to analyze this problem. The result shows that market leaders gain market share greater than their expected network size while market followers gain market share less than their expected network size. For weak network effect products, with the enhancement of network effect, the differentiation of product quality between the two enterprises intensified, and the difference in price and profit expanded accordingly. When the intensity of the network effect is low enough, the market followers make greater profits by using the advantages of the back-end. For strong network effect products, market leaders use the advantages of first mover to get more profits.