“Thucydides Trap” is the description about the cause for the war between Athens and Sparta in BC5 in The Peloponnesian War by Thucydides， which states that “it was the increasing of Athenian power and the fear it inspired in Sparta that made the war inevitable.” Thucydides thinks that the competition between a rising power and the existing ruling hegemony mostly ends up with wars. In another word， the “Thucydides Trap” refers to that a rising power is bound to challenge the existing dominant power and the dominant power in turn will certainly make a response to the threat. In the end the war cannot be avoided.
　　The application of the “Thucydides Trap” in China-US relations gradually becomes an explicit concept as Graham Allison， a Harvard professor， proposed that “Thucydides’s Trap has been sprung in the Pacific.” However， we should seriously consider such problems as whether the concept put forward by Thucydides， which was used to interpret the war between Athens and Sparta， can be applied to today’s China-US relations or not， and which misunderstandings will emerge during the application. Only by solving those problems can we refrain from blindly expanding the concept of “Thucydides Trap，” wrongly applying it to China-US relations and even damaging the momentum of the sound development of China-US relations. The article will follow this thread and analyze the application of the “Thucydides Trap” in current China-US relations at a global level and from the aspect of the bilateral relations between China and the US together with the characteristics of the internet age， with a view to preventing this concept from being the obstacle of developing a new pattern of major-country relations between China and the US.
　　The Expansive Tendencies of the “Thucydides Trap” Concept
　　The discussion about China-US relations seemingly tended to be collectively pessimistic in 2015. In April when he made his testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services， Allison quoted the “Thucydides Trap” and reported his findings， “In 12 of 16 cases in the past 500 years when a rising power challenged a ruling power， the outcome was war.” In the speech delivered in the American Symposium of the World Forum on China Studies in May， David M. Lampton， an American scholar， pointed out that “the tipping point is near.” He held that “we are witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for predominantly positive US-China ties.” In his keynote speech delivered to the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong in June， David Shambaugh， another American scholar， indicated that it is getting more and more difficult to balance the relationship between China and the US with its continual deterioration. When President Xi Jinping paid a visit to the US at the end of September， once again Allison published an article entitled “The Thucydides Trap： Are the US and China Headed for War？” in The Atlantic， which argued that one topic would be excluded from the visit agenda， that is “the possibility that the United States and China could find themselves at war in the next decade.” Some academic conferences also have made exclusive investigations on the issue. For instance， Australian National University specially convened an academic conference on “Power Transition and Thucydides Trap in Asia and the Pacific.” Since entering the year 2016， the China Development Forum held in Beijing in March was also themed by “Avoiding Thucydides’s Trap” and the dialogues between Henry Kissinger and Dai Bingguo， the former State Councilor， were also arranged. Kissinger was convinced that there was no such Thucydides Trap between China and the US that a rising power was destined to defy the existing power and war is unavoidable. These speeches， reports， articles and conferences have further pushed people of all walks of life in China and the US to doubt， discuss and analyze the odds of conflicts between China and the US， which has boosted the expanded application of this concept whether they are for or against it. 　　The concept of “Thucydides Trap” is gradually entering into the text and vocabulary of the Western political and academic circles. Robert Zoellick， the former president of the World Bank， issued an article in The National Interest titled “U.S.， China and Thucydides： How can Washington and Beijing avoid typical patterns of distrust and fear？” Zbigniew Brzezinski， an American strategist， had an interview and published an article on “Can China Avoid the Thucydides Trap？” These Western discourses largely imply worries about China-US relations and the China threat. Nevertheless， a small portion of voices have expressed doubt about the concept. For example， in his article on “Beware the ‘Thucydides Trap’ Trap： Why the US and China aren’t necessarily Athens and Sparta or Britain and Germany before World War I，” James R. Holmes analyzes the differences between the current China-US relations and the relations of Athens and Sparta as well as the relations of Britain-Germany before WWI， the latter two of which ended with wars.
　　Within China， the application of the “Thucydides Trap” concept seems to augment. Not only has the media widely used this concept， but many academic reviews also have mentioned it. What is different from the thoughts of the China threat implicit in the Western discourses is that Chinese discourses more often than not include the efforts to clarify that China will not fall into the “Thucydides Trap，” whose major expressions are reactive reviews and analyses. The contents often consist of doubts of the “Thucydides Trap” in China-US relations， discussions on how to surpass the “Thucydides Trap” as well as associative analyses of the new model of major-country relations between China and the US and the “Thucydides Trap.” During the exclusive interview by the first issue of The World Post at the beginning of 2014， President Xi laid special stress on the efforts to avoid being caught in the “Thucydides Trap.”
　　By carefully examining this concept， it can be seen that now there are following tendencies of expansive application of the “Thucydides Trap” concept， especially in the West.
　　First， the ordinary competitions and conflicts in international relations are expanded into the “Thucydides Trap.” It should be mentioned that this concept can be applied in both a narrow and a broad sense. The expansive tendencies have intermixed the two senses. Strictly speaking， the opinion that the “Thucydides Trap” means changes in the international balance of power result in an inevitable war is an understanding in a narrow sense， while a generalized comprehension is that the change of power balance among countries gives rise to conflicts and even unavoidable rivalries. With the negative tendencies of the comments on China-US relations in the American political and thought circles and accompanied by the existing competitions and conflicts in China-US relations， some people assert that China-US relations have fallen into the “Thucydides Trap.” The exemplification employed by Allison in 2012 to illustrate his assertion that “Thucydides Trap has been sprung in the Pacific region” is， in effect， exactly the potential competitions with the US after the rising of China’s power in the Pacific. Another example is a review， titled “Thucydides’s Trap： US Unwilling to Strike a Compromise with China，” which indicates that the US is caught in a dilemma over containing rising political， economic and military forces of China and avoiding falling into the “Thucydides Trap.” As you see， the normal competitions and conflicts in China-US relations are actually overstated as the “Thucydides Trap.” But historical experiences tell us that rivalries and conflicts is the normality of the world politics， especially among the major powers， and general competitions and conflicts don’t necessarily lead to wars. 　　Second， the “security dilemma” in the realistic views and even the changes in the international balance of power triggered by the prevailing redistribution of the power structures in the international system are over-interpreted into the “Thucydides Trap.” The “security dilemma” refers to that a sense of insecurity caused by alterations in the power balance among states sparks off the escalation of antagonism. John H. Herz， an American scholar， holds that the international politics is exactly the fight for power and the pursuit of power to a maximum， i.e. hegemony is the best approach to safeguarding national safety in the anarchic international system. In the view of realists， the security dilemma not only exists between the rising power and the established power， but also occurs in all changes of power balance in the international system. The “security dilemma” is most frequently applied to China-US relations. Alastair Iain Johnston， a Harvard professor， even directly puts forward “the emerging US-China security dilemma.” Today， a variety of internationally popular theories about international relations， including the theory on the competition for supremacy， the theory on the decline of the hegemony and the theory on power transition， deem that China-US conflicts cannot be avoided. For instance， a British opinion article says that “Unless China’s economy collapses like Japan in the1980s or its political system collapses like USSR in the 1990s， there seems to be no way for it to escape the Thucydides Trap.” The “Thucydides Trap” has become another tool exploited by the realistic school to amplify and elucidate the so-called “security dilemma” in international relations.
　　Third， the discourses about the “China threat” theory in the West are expanded into the “Thucydides Trap.” The “Thucydides Trap” has been a word of high frequency in different versions of the “China threat” theory in the last two years. In the eyes of Thucydides， there were two causes for the Peloponnesian War： the rise of Athens and the fear it inspired in Sparta. To put it differently， both the rapid increasing of the rising country and the fear of the established hegemonic state may lead to the emergence and development of conflicts. In testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services in April 2015， Allison cited Thucydides’s assessment that the rise of Athens instilled fear in the dominant Spartans， which pushed them to war. Allison attempted to make the US government fully realize the threat of China by means of the “Thucydides Trap，” which exactly demonstrates the Western discourse strategy of amplifying the China threat to achieve a certain goal. The anxiety， doubt and suspicion many countries in the world entertain toward China’s rise are obviously augmenting. At just the right time， the “Thucydides Trap” provides a discourse instrument for all kinds of the “China threat” theory to magnify the threat. For example， New York Times defines the “Thucydides Trap” as “the theory that American anxiety about China’s increasing power might evolve into animosity and aggression.” It serves to show that the “China threat” theory is exaggerated as the tendency of the “Thucydides Trap.” 　　Why does the “Thucydides Trap，” which has existed for thousands of years， suddenly become a popular concept in international relations in the West and tends to be applied more widely？ First and foremost， changes of the international balance of power put pressure on the US. As Allison says in “The Thucydides Trap Project，” that China’s rise challenges the US Predominance in Asia today and in the world in the future and thus constitutes today’s “Thucydides Trap.” According to the standpoints of classical realism， China is by all means considered to challenge the existing American hegemony with the build-up of China’s real power regardless of the subjective intentions of China’s leaders. At the same time， Such international architectures as the BRICS system， the SCO， the AIIB with China as the major participator or even leader are also deemed as challenges to the traditional international system dominated by the US.
　　Subsequently， it is the need of American realistic policy towards China. Comparing China-US relations to the “Thucydides Trap” seemingly can offer forceful historical and experimental evidences to American realistic policy on China. At the same time， the potential China-US war inferred by the “Thucydides Trap” affords theoretical support for the US military presence in the world and the military enterprises that benefit a number of interest groups.
　　Last of all， it is needed by the Western academic circles， the US included， to gain influences and resources. On the one hand， it is difficult to come up with new great theories and great ideas in the current studies community of international relations. It is no less than raising a new theory to find the “Thucydides Trap” which narrates anecdotes of the past in alluding to the present. Hence it must become the target many scholars and experts compete to analyze. On the other hand， the China-US conflicts indicated by the “Thucydides Trap” can enhance the importance of the relevant studies in all universities and think tanks， thus striving for more resources for the academic circles.
　　China-US Relations Can Evade Thucydides Trap
　　Undoubtedly， plenty of strategic distrust exists in China-US relations and seems to grow in the past two years. Particularly with the increasing of China’s power， the gestures China naturally makes on the issue of safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity appear to further trigger a wave of scholars and experts on China-US relations skepticism. It is not easy for China-US relations to get rid of the “Thucydides Trap” thought. Therefore， we should analyze it at both theoretical and practical levels with a calm mind so as to disprove the wrong analogies of this thought in the current China-US relations with systematical analyses and solid reasons. The purpose of this article is not to overthrow this concept stemming from the West. After all， it has certain explanatory power in history. However， it is not applicable to today’s China-US relations. And there are following three reasons why China-US relations can escape from the “Thucydides Trap” irrespective of the various efforts of the two sides to avoid it. 　　Global Level
　　The globalized environment of complex interdependence
　　The European experiences in ancient Greece period cannot be borrowed into the current China-US relations. Unlike the past， the deep integration of different systems and economic societies in different countries， which did not exist in the Thucydides’s age， has appeared today， like the mutual investments of humongous size， trades of scale as well as the labor division of the international industrial chain under the globalized environment. In retrospect of the Europe then， the relations among all countries were maintained only by political interests and national alliances. Hardly were there either mutual trade and investment of scale or economic ties of mutual employment. At the same time， such non-traditional issues as environment hardly occupied any important position in transnational relations.
　　Nowadays， the world is stepping into a globalized era， or an era of “complex interdependence” put forward by Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Prosperity of one country unnecessarily brings along that of others， but damage of one country inevitably harms others. To some extent the globe has become a complex and interdependent community of shared future. The form of the labor division and rivalries about the international industrial chain has tightly tied up the interests of major powers. Military confrontations among any countries will bring harm to both the fundamental interests of the countries concerned， and peace and development of the whole world. Simultaneously， with the increasing prominence of non-traditional security issues and the continual growth of the common challenges confronted by all countries， the governance of any non-traditional security issue， covering international terrorism， ecological unbalance， environmental pollution， and resource shortage， is beyond the capacity of any country and entails global joint efforts to cope with. In the context of complex interdependence among all countries， the willingness of the rising power and the established power to confront each other has been greatly weakened. The risk of conflicts and wars between them also has been significantly reduced. Three most-recent cases of the four given by Allison in which wars don’t break out in the end show that the traditional international relations are being reshaped in the globalized age.
　　Constraint of the collective security mechanism
　　Former US President Wilson once highlighted a variety of prerequisites for realizing peace based on national self-determination and modern democratic mechanisms， such as collective security， disarmament and establishment of national alliances. That is to say， international organizations and international law are a kind of mechanism to achieve international peace. However， in ancient Greece period there lacked such mechanisms as international organizations and international law to ensure collective security. It even might be said that there was no formed collective security mechanism in the international community before WWII. Military forces became the most effective tool that was be used most frequently in the era without the constraint of international law. This is also one of the reasons why up to 12 of 16 groups of cases about the relations between challenging countries and hegemonic powers in the past 500 years ended up with wars when Allison reviewed them. 　　At present， the increasing rigidification of international law and international organizations plays a role in constraining interstate conflicts. Even though some people may question the actual constraint force of international law and international organizations on major countries， the US in particular， the collective security mechanism at least has reinforced the moral restraint and increased the violation costs of international profile and public opinion. At the same time， the compulsory system of international law has got more rigid with the emergence of the entities of many international organizations. And more and more terms embodying the idea of “direct application” arise in the rules of international organizations. Relevant legislation and arbitration begin to be characterized by enforcement and rigidity. Although the rigidity of international law is not comparable with that of domestic laws， the international community is still able to exert influence in indirect ways so as to realize the goal of its compulsion. For example， the regularization of international organizations enables the rules of institutionalized sanctions to increasingly prevail. It compels all countries to take into consideration the constraint of the international community and potential international sanctions caused by risky actions while making strategic choices.
　　Deep dread of war in view of historical experiences
　　Historical experiences have greatly changed people’s attitude toward the war. Ancient Greeks generally thought that wars were predestined. In reality， the perception that the war is ineluctable is often the important cause for the war. What’s more， before WWI， the majority of Europeans did not come to realize that the war would bring about tremendous devastation. Instead， they even considered a great war as a healthy and beneficial exercise for society. Yet this kind of optimistic attitude disappeared in the ruins of the two world wars. There is victory and defeat in the battlefield， but no winner in the war. These memories of wars prompt the international community to more advocate competition rather than war， promote to gain wealth and power by adopting legal means rather than violent approaches， and emphasize the legitimacy and conditionality of preparing and applying rules.
　　Both Immanuel Kant and Louis L. Ludlow suppose that wars would have been dramatically reduced if those who suffered from wars had directly expressed their opinions. The costs of suffering from all previous wars lead to deep fear of war and extreme desire for peace of all governments and people. The international relations after WWII become calmer and more rational due to learning from the historical lessons. All countries are encouraged to solve interstate conflicts through consultation and avoid imposing one’s own will on others with military threats. Just as the article “Thucydides Trap 2.0： Superpower Suicide？” indicates， it is clear to both China and the US that the China-US confrontation predicated by the “Thucydides Trap” will not only menace their own interests， but also damage all other countries that maintain a cooperative relationship with China and the US and even the whole environment of the international system. 　　Bilateral Level
　　“Structural common interests” greater than “structural contradictions”
　　China-US structural contradictions still exist due to the differences in the social system， values and priorities of national interests. There seems to be many contradictory points between China and the US including the South China Sea issue， TPP and the Internet security. The two countries increasingly believe that the other side is the major competitor in political， economic and security fields. On the other hand， their interdependence is further strengthened， not weakened. China and the US are progressing toward “a community of shared interests” with the addition of their structural common interests. After being swelled to a certain extent， any detrimental factor will be crushed by intertwined economy and interlinked finances， interdependent trades， exchanges of people， mutual visits of leaders and wide communications in education， culture and arts. Such heavy interdependence in economy and society between today’s China and the US has never appeared among countries that fought against each other for hegemony in history. Besides， since domestic political and economic development are the common focus of China and the US， mutual confrontation will only disturb the respective domestic priorities and central tasks.
　　Economic interdependence is usually recognized as the bedrock of stable China-US relations. In Conflict with China： Prospects， Consequences， and Strategies for Deterrence， four scholars in the Rand Corporation decline to “assess armed conflict between the United States and China as probable in any of these instance” in consideration of the high level of China-US economic interdependence and the unprecedented economic connections among China， the US and the world， because any armed conflict with China would inevitably heavily damage and even destroy American economy even if the danger of nuclear war were set aside and both sides deliberately eschewed employment of economic weapons. Moreover， China and the US have lots of common interests on the issue of global governance. Not only do the two countries serve as inseparable twin engines in promoting globalization and global governance， but they have more cooperation than divergences in numerous significant issues， such as cooperative agreement on climate change， joint efforts on nuclear non-proliferation， and the roles in achieving the nuclear deal with Iran as well as mutual cooperation on the DPRK nuclear issue. 　　“Social evolutionary” strategic rivalry in the place of traditional strategic antagonism
　　China-US strategic rivalry in the new era does not take the form of traditional strategic antagonism of security threats and territorial expansion， but is a kind of social evolutionary strategic competition. According to the interpretation of Tang Shiping about social evolutionism of international politics， social evolution is embodied as the long-term and systematic evolution of social elements on the basis of the “variation-selection-inheritance” interactive mechanism. From this perspective， the strategic competition between China and the US is a long-term and systematic race for institutional change and a side-by-side long-distance running which tests basics and endurance， instead of a match that will be won or lost in a limited time. Kissinger once also cited “co-evolution” to describe China-US relations and advised that both China and the US should promote respective interests in cooperation and competition and put co-evolution into reality so as to head for the “Pacific community.” The application of “crossing the river by feeling the stones，” a concept raised by Deng Xiaoping， into China-US relations actually can be understood as co-evolution.
　　On the one hand， traditional strategic antagonism is rooted in the challenge to the international order posed by the rising power. As an emerging power， China has pursued its development and progress by stressing the continual integration into the international order in peaceful ways， rather than by means of wars or traditional military and territorial expansion. After comparing the development of all civilizations in the world， Arnold Toynbee concluded that China， as an oriental power that is great but never pursues hegemonism， has never demonstrated its imperialistic ambitions beyond its own domain. Additionally Kissinger noted that military imperialism has never been China’s style. Chas W. Freeman， the famous American diplomat， deems that “China is different from Germany， Japan， the former USSR， and even the US， because China will neither seek for the so-called ‘living space’ put forward by the Germany fascists before WWII， nor pursue what is similar to ‘Manifest Destiny’ proposed by the US. China won’t export its ideology overseas.” Mr. Lee Kuan Yew once said that China-US relationship is different from US-Soviet relations during the Cold War since in nature the former Soviet Union competed for global hegemony with the US while China just takes its national interests as a priority. Hence， the external strategies of China are fundamentally based on its domestic development goals. 　　On the other hand， traditional strategic antagonism stems from the so-called “power transition theory” as well. On the ground of the studies of international relations， if the strengths of a “dominant power” and a “rising power” nearly approach the same level， or their difference in strengths becomes unclear， the possibility of power substitution will reach a peak and the chance of conflicts and wars for hegemony will be considerably raised. Nonetheless， no fundamental change occurs to the balance of relative strengths of China and the US in spite of a few variations. The economic bulk of China probably may overtake that of the US in the next decade， but the US will still be ahead of China in the coming decades in terms of military resources and soft power resources. On the other side， some still holds that the US does exert huge influence on the current international order and benefits a lot from it， whereas it has not got in the dominant position assumed by the power transition theory. Hereafter， with the further weakening of the capacity of major countries to impose preferences on others， the impetus of emerging powers to rival the existing order or to establish a parallel order will be accordingly impaired. In practice， some studies find that there is no such phenomenon as a power transition conflict at all. Conflicts involve a multitude of other important factors besides the differences in power growth. In line with the studies， the Peloponnesian War was not inevitable at all， given that the change of the relative strengths between Athens and Sparta at most served as an indirect reason or prerequisite of the war.
　　The reason of state under nuclear deterrence in the place of Hobbes’s logic
　　The reason of state under nuclear deterrence is the core assurance for China and the US not to really get caught into the “Thucydides Trap.” The “Thucydides Trap” is not unavoidable in that the cause for its occurrence is to a great degree the evil consequence of unwise strategies， instead of simply the fear induced by the power growth. Before the destructive weapons came into existence， the international relations were dominated by disordered rivalries with wars and conflicts as the main means for acquiring power and consequently Hobbes’s logic continually took up the dominant position in international politics.
　　The irrational antagonism at the time of Thucydides has been out of date in modern society. In the nuclear era， notwithstanding that the global politics yet has not broken away from anarchy， the reason of major countries turned up due to the national fear of thorough destruction and the sense for protecting human civilizations， and the world is gradually stepping into a stage of ordered power games. In a sense， the mechanism of a “balance of nuclear terror” is converted into a more substantive “balance of warfare terror.” No countries want the terrible prospect of mutual assured destruction to come into reality caused by the outbreak of a war. China-US relations get into a relatively stable stage with China’s entry into the elite nuclear club. The previous political structure that was inclined to disordered games has also change into a political construction featuring ordered competitions. Seeing that the balance of nuclear terror could keep the Cold War under control so that the contest for hegemony between the former Soviet Union and the US in the 20th century didn’t evolve into military conflicts， it is also capable of restraining China-US relations in the 21st century so as not to stray into the evil ways of war. 　　Features of the Internet Age
　　Joined-up thinking in the Internet age
　　The joined-up thinking spawned by the Internet age can be perceived in three aspects. First， it means that the Internet culture shapes the people’s holistic thinking. The reform of people’s thinking mode and ideas is directly provoked by such an extreme transmission speed that the whole world can be interconnected just by pressing one key， and the interconnection that overcomes the time limit and geographical obstacles. Second， the connectivity of cyberspace itself brings in an overall thinking about behavior and the material world. The connected state of cyberspace penetrates every aspect of the realistic society. Not only does it increasingly reinforce the interdependence and correlation among all countries， but such challenges of cyberspace itself as the issue of network security including cyber-terrorism call for global response. Third， the fragility of a shared cyberspace generates a type of integral thinking. The structural characteristics of cyberspace determine that any of the most vulnerable processes may provide chance for attacks. Despite the geographical separation between China and the US with the vast Pacific lying between them， the development of cyberspace and space technologies enables China and the US to share power space again and also contributes to the inseparable integrity of the interests among all countries. This type of joined-up thinking is conducive to both the rational decision-making in the Internet era and the prevention of major-country conflicts.
　　Transparency and convenience for the crisis prevention and communications
　　In Man， the State and War： A Theoretical Analysis， the author notes that clear intentions can promote the mutual understanding of citizens in all countries so as to enhance world peace. Similarly， the social adjustment of individual behavior gets improved through reducing despair and a sense of insecurity， which in turn can decrease the frequency of outbreak of wars. Now in the highly networked times， the transparency of the world news and information， and the transparency of national strategic dynamics and policy choices are unparalleled. As usual， transparency includes three implications， i.e. policy transparency， information transparency and communication transparency. The contributions made by the Internet mainly lie in two aspects： active transparency （proactive exposure of the policy， relevant information and communications of the states concerned）； passive transparency （big data in cyberspace and relative messages contained in massive information）. As part of the building of confidence mechanism， transparency makes it possible to diminish and even eliminate the risk of misunderstanding or misjudgment among the international actors. 　　The real-time and effectiveness of network exchanges and contacts also provide convenience for crisis prevention and communications. Communications play an important role in the several examples of power transition mentioned by Allison that did not end up with wars. Crises can be classified as the crises under the hostile and conflicting background and the sporadic crises. Under the current circumstance that rational thinking and joined-up thinking predominate， the international crises tend to be incidental and sporadic. As for the crises in a conflicting context， the Internet affords to the interested sides facilities to share core interests and behavioral intentions， which facilitates mutual balance and negotiations. The unofficial and uninterrupted communications and contacts through Internet can ease tensions among countries and search alternative solutions. In regard to the sporadic crises triggered by occasional accidents， the impacts of Internet are more conspicuous. This type of crises is characterized by evident abruptness and entails immediate responses. The real-time and convenience of network communications and diversity in the choices of audio， video and text endow crisis prevention and communications with great facility.
　　Check of China-US relations conducted by social forces
　　La Bruyere， the French philosopher in the 17th century， is convinced that only peace can guarantee the real interests of all while wars just make the royal interests. Thomas Paine， an American political activist， also indicates that people’s interests consist in peace whereas monarchical power is the enemy of human race and the root of suffering. In history， the right to initiate a war rested with the decision-makers with limited effects of ordinary people. However， the political engagement through Internet and the function of political mobilization stimulate the growth of social forces. The strong network public opinion that comes out with Internet supervises national power and affects a country’s domestic and foreign policies. Furthermore， the fact that Internet provides the general public with a great deal of diplomatic information means the corresponding promotion of public authority with information acquisition as the major source of power. In addition， Internet boosts the birth of We Media so as to exercise influence on the national decision-making in the form of media. All demonstrate the reciprocal restrictions and checks between the country and society in the Internet age. 　　China-US relationship is not simply state-to-state relations anymore， but also touches upon the connections between societies. China-US diplomatic relations no longer just matter to government organizations and leaders， but also involve massive social forces. Relations between the Chinese and the US governments will face restraint， adjustment and rectification from social forces if deterioration arises. Wars won’t and shouldn’t happen between China and the US. Even if there exist interest groups that preach progress towards wars or unavoidable conflicts in two countries， the motivation of the general public， the biggest interest group， for anti-war and the pursuit of peace can smash any petty niggling of all special interest groups. The increasingly frequent and deep cultural exchanges between the ordinary people in the two countries bear the weight of China-US relations like a vast net and they are more like ubiquitous air to maintain the “survival” of China-US relations. The groundwork of China-US relations eventually still depends on “the silent majority.”
　　In addition to the three reasons above， we also need to investigate the applicability of this concept from the thoughts and standpoint of the proposer. As a matter of fact， while citing Thucydides Trap in China-US relations presented by Allison， most people just simply refer to his literal point without paying attention to the duality of his personal viewpoints. The primary purpose for which he brings up the idea of “Thucydides Trap” is not to suggest that the war between China and the US is inevitable， but to expect that Americans and the US government to be aware of the rising of China’s strength and its significance， and remind Americans to watch out for the risk of the outbreak of war between China and the US.
　　Additionally， Allison himself is amending this concept. He points out that the four sets of challenging power-hegemonic power relations finally circumvent wars and it is at the price of massive and tough adjustments on both sides， including in the aspects of attitudes and behavior， which is more difficult for the hegemonic power， but China and the US are wise and capable enough to shun the “Thucydides Trap.” Allison also specially wrote an article titled “Don’t Worry， the Next World War is Not Upon US…Yet” after comparing the Current China-US military relationship with the situation in 1914. He lists the similarities （like postures of the rising power and the established power， gradually increasing nationalist sentiment， strong military presences directed against archenemy， and interconnected alliance system） between the present circumstances and the situation in 1914. This article mainly displays differences， such as mutual assured destruction of economies between China and the US， “crisis instability” evoked by borderless outer space and cyberspace， “crystal-ball effect” of nuclear weapons， currently incomparable essence of the military power between the two countries， transparency brought about by information technology， as well as other factors including the structure of the world politics. Although the author supposes that the probability of major-country wars still exists， but he holds that wars won’t break out in the next decade， and the possibilities for wars will be further lowered if leaders of all countries learn from history. 　　In addition， two points are noteworthy for the history written by any historian. On the one hand， it is nearly impossible to include all contents and facts of historical events and all history is a simplified version. It may mislead us to ignore some factors that shouldn’t have been neglected despite the fact that historians often strive to present the whole a true story. On the other hand， the works of any historian are affected by such factors as his values， preferences and stance during his writing. Just as the purpose of Thucydides’s writing was to explore how Athenian to draw a lesson from the war and to criticize the misjudgment of Pericles and Democrats， so more emphasis was put on the “prisoner’s dilemma” then. Thucydides’s history books neither mean to mislead his posterity nor hold prejudices， but they just intend to show that people’s cognition of events is not immutable and each generation is rewriting history. Accordingly， we should avoid any simple historical analogy.
　　Hazardness and Inspiration of “Thucydides Trap” Discourses
　　The greatest significance of China-US relations avoiding the “Thucydides Trap” is to exclude its disturbance and harmfulness to the new pattern of major-country relations between China and the US， in that there is a good deal of perniciousness by linking the “Thucydides Trap” with China and it will hinder China and the US from energetically explore solutions in the form of cooperation.
　　To begin with， for China-US relations， the “Thucydides Trap” discourses easily give rise to aggressive policy leanings on both sides. Allusion to the present by using anecdotes of the past can vividly enlighten the world， but oversimplified historical analogies are likely to mislead people’s observation and understanding of the contemporary world. “Bad historical analogies” and “faulty theories” have led some parties in both China and the US to promote more aggressive stances towards the other. Practically， lots of reasons lead to the war between Athens and Sparta. Allison lays undue stress on the expansion of Athens and the fear felt by Sparta and even partially exaggerates the threat of China’s rise while further applying the “Thucydides Trap” to China-US relations. He overlooks the exact cause for Sparta’s fear and the way of Athenian expansion， ultimately distorting Thucydides’s original idea. Thus， Thucydides did not necessarily foresee the trap of China-US conflicts， and yet this concept plays a trick on China-US relations and brings enormous impediment for China to implement the new pattern of major-country relations between China and the US. 　　Second， for the regional situation， the “Thucydides Trap” discourses may spur neighboring countries to take sides， which is not conducive to China’s neighboring diplomatic environment. The policy of “Asia Pivot” adopted by the US to some extent manifests its fear of and precaution against China’s rise， though the US claims that it does not intend to “contain” China， but to “deter” China from damaging the existing Asian order， thereby safeguarding the order and peace in Asia. This kind of psychology and action， if coupled with the simplistic propaganda of the “Thucydides Trap，” is extremely likely to stimulate some countries in Asia to imitate other states in Greece at the age of Thucydides by taking sides between China and the US. Even though some countries are still waiting， a few nations indeed have chosen to take the side of the US to overcome the fear of China’s rise， which constitutes an exceedingly unfavorable factor for China’s neighboring diplomatic climate.
　　Last of all， for the world situation， the “Thucydides Trap” discourses will exercise influence on the world opinion， intensify the division of camps and thus impact the development of the new pattern of major-country relations between China and the US. The “Thucydides Trap” discourses should come as no surprise if we treat the increasing growth of the strength of the other side from the worst preset scenario while judging the complex issue of national security， and they are bound to be marketable. Yet it must be arbitrary and hazard if we simply account for historical terms regardless of the historical context and then attach them to international affairs and academic reviews as a label. Once this kind of erroneous cognition is allowed to shape the world opinion and become a consensus and customary recognition of academic circles， media and the public， it will not only impede the progress of China-US relations， but also immensely hinder the development of the world situation in times of peace.
　　Considering the harmfulness of the “Thucydides Trap” discourses， it is necessary for us to refute them from a theoretical point of view in case that this fallacy would “kidnap” China-US relations and even endanger the future cooperative development pattern of the new pattern of major-country relations between China and the US for mutual benefit and win-win results. The “Thucydides Trap” is not an iron law， not to mention that we should have blind faith in it. Particularly in the present 21st century， we should analyze it objectively on the footing of globalization and the structural features of China-US relations. Judging from the global level， bilateral level between China and the US as well as the traits of the Internet era， the “Thucydides Trap” is not applicable to China-US relations. 　　Admittedly， that China-US relations can avert the “Thucydides Trap” doesn’t mean that we can rest easy. But after all， the “Thucydides Trap” is just a theoretical hypothesis and unlikely to be self-realized even if all conditions are met. Early in 2005， Joseph Nye suggested that the war was not inevitable though the concerns of Sparta about the strong economic rise of Athens constituted the root of the Peloponnesian War and the war could completely be circumvented through negotiations and people’s sensible policies. China and the US are able to realize a long-term stable relationship in these ways. Wars won’t and shouldn’t occur between the two countries. The leaders of the former Soviet Union and the US could refrain from wars during the Cold War， let alone today’s leaders of China and the US. Fortunately， avoiding falling into the “Thucydides Trap” has become the common view at the top levels in China and the US with the explicitation of this conception. Just as President Xi Jinping mentioned in his speech at Seattle during the visit to the US， there is no such thing as the so-called “Thucydides Trap” in the world and both countries shall persist in the correct direction of building a new pattern of major-country relations.