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本文考虑了企业利润最大化目标策略性偏离的两种模型:一种是将生产的控制权委托给经理;另外一种是通过对生产要素供应的契约将部分可变成本转化成固定成本。我们发现在一般情况下,这两种模型会得到不同结果。即使得到相同的均衡产量和价格,企业所有者的利润也可能因为委托和成本转化这两种方式的费用不同而不同。
This paper considers two models of corporate profit maximization goals that are strategically deviated: one is to delegate control of production to the manager; the other is to convert part of the variable costs into fixed costs through contracts for the supply of production factors. We found that under normal circumstances, these two models will have different results. Even with the same balanced output and prices, the profits of business owners may differ depending on the cost of commissioning and cost conversion.