本文借助异质品双寡头Stackelberg竞争模型,在国际贸易背景下考察进口国关税对外国企业授权策略选择及进口国社会福利的影响。研究表明,技术授权能否发生与授权方式、关税水平和技术创新程度有关。固定收费方式下,只有关税水平较高或技术创新程度较高时,技术授权才会发生;特许权收费和双重收费方式都增加了技术拥有企业利润,且双重收费方式可以实现技术拥有企业利润最大化。当技术创新程度较高或关税水平较高时,无论哪种授权方式都可能损害进口国社会福利。 In this paper, with the heterogeneous Stackelberg competition model of duopoly oligarchs, this paper examines the impact of import tariffs on the choice of foreign-funded enterprises and the social welfare of importing countries under the background of international trade. Research shows that the technology licensing can occur with the authorization method, the tariff level and the degree of technological innovation. Under the fixed charging method, the technical authorization will occur only when the tariff level is higher or the degree of technological innovation is higher. The franchise charging and the double charging methods both increase the profit of technology-owned enterprises and the double charging method can achieve the maximum profits of technology-owned enterprises The When the degree of technological innovation is high or the level of tariffs is high, no matter what type of authorization may damage the social welfare of the importing country.