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以基本的“收益共享契约”为基础,以集中控制型VMI&TPL模式为对象,研究供应链上游段各成员企业的协调。由于基本的收益共享契约不能对供应链进行有效协调,提出了基于风险共担的收益共享契约,但是该契约不能实现供应链各成员的期望收益的帕累托最优。为了改进这一缺陷,建立了基于不对称的Nash协商的风险共担型的收益共享契约模型。分析表明:该模型不仅克服了不能实现供应链各成员的期望收益达到帕累托最优的缺点,还可以实现各参与企业的期望收益的帕累托最优。
Based on the basic “revenue sharing contract”, the centralized control VMI & TPL model is used to study the coordination among the member companies in the upper reaches of the supply chain. Since the basic revenue sharing contract can not effectively coordinate the supply chain, a revenue sharing contract based on risk sharing is proposed, but the contract can not achieve the optimal Pareto of the expected return of each member of the supply chain. In order to improve this defect, a revenue-sharing contract model based on asymmetric Nash negotiation is established. The analysis shows that the model not only overcomes the shortcomings that the expected returns of each member in the supply chain can not reach the Pareto optimality, but also realizes the Pareto optimality of the expected returns of the participating firms.