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独立性是独立董事发挥监督职能的重要基础。当独立董事的选择任命受到CEO影响时,独立董事还能有效发挥监督职能么?本文通过研究2007~2015年A股上市公司CEO选任独董与企业盈余平滑程度之间的关系发现,CEO选任独董越多,企业盈余平滑程度越高。进一步研究发现,这一结果是因为独立董事选择任命受到CEO影响导致独立性下降而造成的。对监管部门来说,要有效发挥独立董事的监督职能,就必须严格把关独立董事的选择与任命,避免企业出现“自我监督”的情形。
Independence is an important basis for independent directors to exercise their supervisory functions. When the choice of independent directors is influenced by the CEO, can the independent director also play an effective supervisory role? By studying the relationship between the CEO-selected independent directors and the smoothness of the corporate earnings of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2015, Dong more, the higher the smooth degree of corporate earnings. Further research found that this result was due to the decline of independence caused by the selection of independent directors by the CEO. For regulatory authorities, in order to give full play to the supervisory functions of independent directors, it is necessary to strictly check the selection and appointment of independent directors so as to prevent enterprises from “self-monitoring ”.