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以2009—2013年间我国房地产行业上市企业对非上市企业的收购事件为样本,就地方政府干预对主并企业并购后绩效造成的影响进行研究。结果表明:无论从短期角度还是从长期角度,房地产上市企业在收购非上市企业后均普遍取得负向的并购后绩效,但地方政府干预程度与主并企业并购后绩效呈显著正相关关系。房地产行业的自身特点以及一些地方政府为追求政绩而进行的不合理干预共同导致了房地产行业上市企业并购后的负向绩效,但地方政府为确保财政收入而进行的干预则在一定程度上平抑了负向绩效。
Taking the acquisition of listed non-listed companies in China’s real estate industry during 2009-2013 as a sample, this paper studies the impact of local government intervention on the performance of M & A after M & A. The results show that real estate listed companies generally have negative post-M & A performance in both short-term and long-term perspectives, but there is a significant positive correlation between the degree of local government intervention and the performance of M & A mergers and acquisitions. The real estate industry’s own characteristics as well as the unreasonable interventions of some local governments in pursuit of political achievements have led to the negative performance after the mergers and acquisitions of real estate listed companies. However, the interventions by local governments to ensure their financial revenue have been dampened to a certain extent Negative performance.