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本文以评级机构与发债企业的串谋行为为切入点,分析评级机构的数量选择对企业债券信用风险监管的影响。通过建立博弈模型,本文分析了评级机构数量与串谋风险的关系,结果发现评级机构数量越多,串谋的风险越大。之后,本文进一步分析了评级机构数量与垄断风险和寻租风险间的关系,证明了只有当串谋风险、垄断风险和寻租风险的总和最小时,评级机构数量水平才是最优的。最后,本文给出了相关政策建议。
This article takes the conspiracy of rating agencies and issuing enterprises as the starting point, and analyzes the influence of quantity selection of rating agencies on the regulation of corporate bonds credit risk. Through the establishment of a game model, this paper analyzes the relationship between the number of rating agencies and the risk of conspiracy, and found that the more the rating agencies, the greater the risk of conspiracy. After that, this paper further analyzes the relationship between the number of rating agencies and monopoly risk and rent-seeking risk and proves that the quantitative level of rating agencies is optimal only when the sum of conspiracy risk, monopoly risk and rent-seeking risk is the minimum. Finally, this article gives the relevant policy recommendations.