当前有这种观点:“思维和存在的同一性”不能作为哲学基本问题第二个方面的概括。理由是:“思维和存在的同一性”在哲学史上是已经确定了的唯心主义命题,用它来概括哲学基本问题的第二个方面,会抹煞认识领域里唯物主义和唯心主义的对立;而且,思维和存在的关系中应该既有同一性,又有斗争性,如果只用“同一性”来概括思维和存在的关系问题的第二方面,就会抛弃斗争性,违反对立统一规律。这种观点是值得商榷的。我们认为,哲学基本问题的第二个方面应该是思维和存在的同一性问题。哲学基本问题的第二个方面是思维能不能认识存在的问题哲学基本问题的第二个方面是思维能不能认识存在的问题。关于这个问题,恩格斯是这样表述的: There is a current view that “the sameness of thinking and being” can not be summed up as the second aspect of the fundamental problem of philosophy. The rationale is that “the sameness of thinking and being” is an idealist proposition that has been identified in the history of philosophy and uses it to summarize the second aspect of fundamental philosophical problems and to obliterate the opposition between materialism and idealism in the field of knowledge; and , The relationship between thinking and being should be both identical and struggling. If only “identity” is used to summarize the second aspect of the relationship between thinking and being, then we will abandon the struggle and violate the law of unity of opposites. This view is debatable. In our opinion, the second aspect of the fundamental philosophical question should be the question of the identity of thought and existence. The second aspect of the basic philosophical problem is whether the thinking can recognize the existing problems. The second aspect of the basic philosophical problems is whether or not the thinking can recognize the existence. On this issue, Engels made the following statement: