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针对一个由供应商和一个零售商构成的供应链,在零售商成本为私有信息条件下,假设产品的市场需求为零售价格的指数函数,研究如何协调供应链应对突发事件。首先,给出了对称信息下供应链协调模型;然后,研究了不对称信息下集权式与分权式供应链的协调机制;再次,在突发事件引起零售商成本分布函数扰动情况下,通过引入供应商由于可能需要调整生产计划而产生的偏差成本,研究了供应链的最优应对策略。研究表明,供应链的最优生产计划、最优批发价格和最优零售价格均具有一定的鲁棒性,当突发事件造成零售商期望成本在一定范围内发生扰动时,三者可以保持不变,当零售商期望成本扰动超过一定范围内时,则需要对之加以调整,才能有效应对突发事件。最后,通过数值仿真验证了相关结论。
For a supply chain consisting of suppliers and retailers, under the condition of retailers’ costs being private information, it is assumed that the market demand of the products is an exponential function of the retail price and how to coordinate the supply chain to deal with emergencies. First, the coordination model of supply chain under symmetric information is given. Secondly, the coordination mechanism of the centralized and decentralized supply chain under asymmetric information is studied. Thirdly, under the circumstance of disturbances caused by the distribution function of retailers’ cost caused by emergencies, Introducing the bias cost which the supplier may need to adjust the production plan, the optimal coping strategy of the supply chain is studied. The research shows that the optimal production plan, the optimal wholesale price and the optimal retail price in the supply chain all have a certain degree of robustness. When the expected cost of the retailer due to emergencies fluctuates within a certain range, the three can remain unchanged Change, when the retailers expect the cost of disturbance exceeds a certain range, you need to be adjusted in order to effectively respond to emergencies. Finally, the relevant conclusions are verified by numerical simulation.