中国县级决策者主要对上级负责,追求尽可能高的经济增长率,而非居民福利最大化,导致其财政决策偏向生产性支出。基于2067个县(市)2001—2005年财政经济数据的实证检验,为县级财政生产性支出偏向的存在提供了有力的证据。生产性支出偏向严重地妨碍公共财政体制的建设和向公共服务型政府的转型。解决这一问题的根本出路在于逐步增强县级政府满足本地居民需求的激励。 China’s county-level decision-makers are primarily responsible for their superiors, pursuing the highest possible rate of economic growth rather than maximizing the well-being of residents, leading their fiscal decisions toward productive expenditures. Based on the empirical tests of the financial and economic data of 2067 counties (cities) from 2001 to 2005, this provides strong evidence for the existence of the bias of county-level fiscal production expenditure. The propensity for productive expenditure seriously hindered the construction of the public financial system and the transition to a public service-oriented government. The fundamental solution to this problem lies in gradually increasing the incentives of county governments to meet the needs of local residents.