论文部分内容阅读
在低碳经济背景下引入碳排放税及消费者低碳偏好,对供应商主导的二级供应链减排博弈展开研究;进而通过逆向归纳法求得序贯行动的精炼子博弈纳什均衡,并采用数值实验展开分析。研究表明,在外生碳税下供应商和制造商都将采取减排策略,可求得最优产量与单位产品减排量,但征收碳税并不一定能够保证碳排放总量的降低;供应链中一方的减排行为将激励另一方增加单位产品减排量;企业减排成本系数越低,征收碳税对控制碳排放总量的效果越明显。
In the context of low-carbon economy, the introduction of carbon tax and consumer low-carbon preferences, supplier-led secondary supply chain emission reduction game to study; and then through the reverse induction method for the sequential sub-game of fine sub-game Nash equilibrium, and Using numerical experiments to analyze. Research shows that under the exogenous carbon tax, both suppliers and manufacturers will adopt an emission reduction strategy to obtain the optimal output and the emission reductions per unit of product. However, the carbon tax collection does not necessarily ensure the reduction of the total carbon emissions. The supply chain One of the emission reduction activities will encourage the other party to increase emission reductions per unit of product. The lower the emission reduction cost factor, the more effective the carbon tax will be for controlling carbon emissions.