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本文运用数值例子和一般化博弈模型对1个生产商、1个大零售商和n个小零售商的市场进行了考察,给出了大零售商对生产商拥有讨价还价力量、生产商对小零售商拥有讨价还价力量时的市场均衡。结论为:(1)在大零售商使用包含通道费在内的“三部费”合约的市场均衡中,上下游可以实现纵向一体化利润。与生产商对下游完全拥有市场力量的情形相比,消费者剩余不会降低,市场价格不会上升,生产商获得的利润也不会减少。(2)大零售商的利润来自于消除上下游市场外部性,以及对市场效率改进的边际贡献。通道费可以视作是大零售商通过挖掘市场效率而获利的一种机制设计。(3)从政策角度看,用单一禁止通道费来提高市场效率和社会福利的目标往往难以实现。与其简单地取消进场费,还不如把政策的着力点放在支持小零售商、改善零售市场结构效率上。
This paper examines the markets of one producer, one big retailer and n small retailers by using numerical examples and generalized game models. It shows that large retailers have bargaining power over producers and small retailers’ Market equilibrium with bargaining power. The conclusions are as follows: (1) In the market equilibrium of the “three-part contract” which includes the channel fee, the retailer can realize the vertically integrated profit in the upstream and downstream. Compared with the situation in which manufacturers have complete market power in the downstream, consumer surplus will not be reduced, market prices will not rise, and profit margins will not diminish. (2) The profits of the big retailers come from the elimination of the externalities of the upstream and downstream markets and the marginal contribution to market efficiency improvement. Channel fees can be considered as a mechanism for large retailers to monetize market efficiency. (3) From a policy perspective, the objective of raising the market efficiency and social welfare with a single ban on toll fees is often difficult to achieve. Rather than simply canceling entry fees, it may be better to focus the policy on supporting smaller retailers and improving the efficiency of the retail market structure.