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本文主要研究“寡头”市场结构下石油进口国国内税收政策对国际石油价格的影响及最优税率的决定。通过构建短期和跨期的最优税率模型发现,跨期最优税率高于短期最优税率,最优从价税率低于最优从量税率。对美国、欧盟和日本的研究表明,它们具有较强的税负转嫁能力,即其国内的石油税对国际石油价格具有显著的负向影响,证明了最优国内石油税率的存在及合理性,将国内税率调整至最优税率可有效改善其国内福利。应用理论模型对各主要石油进口国最优税率的估计显示,2005年欧盟的实际税率接近最优税率,日本的实际税率显著高于最优税率,而美国与中国的实际税率明显低于最优税率。
This paper mainly studies the influence of the domestic tax policy of oil importing countries on the international oil price under the oligarchic market structure and the optimal tax rate. Through constructing short-term and inter-period optimal tax rate model, it is found that the optimal intertemporal tax rate is higher than the short-term optimal tax rate, and the optimal ad valorem tax rate is lower than the optimal specific tax rate. Studies on the United States, the European Union and Japan show that they have a strong ability to shift taxes, that is, their domestic oil taxes have a significant negative impact on international oil prices, and they prove the existence and rationality of the optimal domestic oil tax rate. Adjusting the domestic tax rate to the optimal tax rate can effectively improve its domestic welfare. Applying the theoretical model to the estimation of the optimal tax rate of the major oil importing countries shows that the actual tax rate of the EU approaches the optimal tax rate in 2005, the actual tax rate in Japan is significantly higher than the optimal tax rate, and the actual tax rate in the United States and China is obviously lower than the optimal one tax rate.