论文部分内容阅读
现阶段,供应链金融中的多任委托代理模型已经成为了各个制造商在发展过程中对一些供应商所产生的线性激励,在实际运行期间可以根据社会的发展现状将其中存在的数据信息进行全方面的分析,将其中影响激励强度和制造上期望收益等影响因素进行简单的分析,并为其制定有效的解决对策,只有这样才能保证供应链金融下的多模式代理激励工作可以顺利进行下去,从而规避一些供应商激励风险。
At this stage, the multi-agency principal-agent model in supply chain finance has become a linear incentive for various manufacturers in the process of development. During the actual operation, the data information can be made according to the development status of society All-round analysis will be a simple analysis of the factors that affect the incentive intensity and the expected profit on the manufacturing, and to develop effective solutions to the problem, the only way to ensure supply chain finance multi-mode agency incentive work can go on smoothly , Thereby circumventing some supplier incentive risk.