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中国的财政分权促进了地区竞争,进而推动经济增长已成为学界共识。但分权式改革引致的竞争究竟是同质竞争还是异质竞争却仍缺乏企业层面的直接证据。文章借助上市公司股价波动中的特质信息和产品市场竞争度等指标,给出经验证据证实:财政分权不仅增加了中国企业特质信息,推动了企业的异质竞争,也推动了系统(市场)信息增长和企业同质竞争。并且,财政分权带来的企业同质竞争要大于异质竞争。这些证据表明,分税制下财权与事权匹配度的缺失以及“锦标赛激励”的政治机制设计,使分权下的地方政府既提升了区域经济的市场竞争力,也强化了政府对经济的干预。两种效应叠加使企业的异质竞争能力相对不足。因此,财政分权改革在中国尚未充分发挥其对企业异质竞争的引导作用。文章最后提出了有针对性的政策建议。
China’s fiscal decentralization has promoted regional competition and further economic growth has become the academic consensus. However, whether the competition caused by decentralized reforms is homogeneous competition or heterogeneous competition still lacks direct evidence at the enterprise level. This article gives some empirical evidences that financial decentralization has not only increased the trait of Chinese enterprises, promoted the heterogeneous competition of enterprises, but also promoted the development of system (market) Information growth and homogeneous competition of enterprises. Moreover, the homogeneity of enterprises brought by fiscal decentralization is greater than the heterogeneous competition. These evidences show that the lack of a match between the fiscal power and the power under the tax-sharing system and the design of the political mechanism for the “championship incentive” make the decentralized local governments not only enhance the market competitiveness of the regional economy but also strengthen the government’s intervention in the economy . The superposition of the two effects makes the enterprise’s heterogeneous competitive ability relatively insufficient. Therefore, the reform of fiscal decentralization in China has not given full play to its guiding role in the heterogeneous competition of enterprises. The article concludes with targeted policy recommendations.