This paper presents the game of production technical standards between downstream and upstream suppliers on a manufacturing supply chain network when the two parties have different partnership densities, namely, the numbers of replaceable and mature manufacturing partners. We firstly constructed a manufacturing chain network and analyzed its three relationship structures among suppliers with the presence of different relationship densities, and found that all the three relationships brought about the game of production technical standards between partnership-rich and partnership-scanty suppliers. Then we built a two-party payoff matrix, and analyzed the two-party game and evolutionary stable strategy, based on replication dynamic equation and asymmetric evolutionary game theory. The evolutionary stable strategies of two parties under varying payoff parameters were validated through numerical simulation. Finally, we proposed some suggestions for both those manufacturers with more partners and fewer partners, respectively. This paper presents the game of production technical standards between downstream and upstream suppliers on a manufacturing supply chain network when the two parties have different partnership densities, namely, the numbers of replaceable and mature manufacturing partners. three relationship structures among suppliers with the presence of different relationship densities, and found that all the three relationships brought about the game of production technical standards between partnership-rich and partnership-scanty suppliers. Then we built a two-party payoff matrix, and analyzed the two-party game and evolutionary stable strategy, based on replication dynamic equation and asymmetric evolutionary game theory. The evolutionary stable strategies of two parties under varying payoff parameters were validated by numerical simulation. Finally, we proposed some suggestions for both those manufacturers with more partne rs and fewer partners, respectively.