论文部分内容阅读
本文以京沪高速铁路建设项目为背景,从委托代理理论的角度对“小业主大咨询”管理模式下监理职能的延伸问题进行了研究,提炼出“双代理”委托代理模型,认为“双代理”是具有中国特色的建设项目委托代理问题。在此基础上,进一步分析了驻勤人员的激励和约束机制,讨论了在固定工资和绩效工资两种契约形式下,监督力度、综合素质等因素对驻勤人员努力选择的影响,以及在最优努力选择下影响业主收益的主要因素,为建立“小业主,大咨询”模式下驻勤人员激励和监督机制的建立提供了理论依据。
Based on the construction project of Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway, this paper studies the extension of supervision function under the mode of “management consulting of small proprietors” from the perspective of principal-agent theory, and extracts the principal-agent model of “double agency” “Double agency ” is a construction project with Chinese characteristics agency problem. On this basis, further analysis of the incentive and restraint mechanism of the stationed workers, discusses the impact of the efforts of supervision, overall quality and other factors on the selection of the diligent workers in the two contract forms of fixed salary and performance salary, Efforts to choose the main factors that affect the profit of the owners, to establish a “small business owners ” mode counselors stationing incentive and supervision mechanism provides a theoretical basis.