本文运用“政府监管俘虏理论”对安然案这个案例进行详细分析,揭示利益集团如何通过不同的手段“俘虏”监管者,利诱或迫使监管者提供对它们有利的监管(包括监管放松)并利用这些监管谋取私利。而这样的行为往往会给监管者标榜所要保护的“公共利益”带来不同程度的损失。 This article uses the “government captives theory” to analyze the Enron case in detail, revealing how interest groups “captive” regulators through different means, arousing or compelling regulators to provide regulatory oversight (including regulatory loosening) over them and using them Regulatory for personal gain. And such acts often give regulators flaunt the protection of the “public interest” bring varying degrees of loss.