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资费独立政策主张参照资费进行网间结算,因为资费相对成本来说,更容易获取。本文从数学的角度分析了通用的网间结算模型,利用纳什均衡指出在成本结构不变的前提下,增加接入费用将造成社会福利降低,同时得出各运营商的利润只与自身的价格和成本因素相关,而与其他运营商的网内价格、网间价格无关。在资费独立的政策下,运营商的利润完全由管制下的市场机制来决定。无论市场处于有效竞争状态下,还是处于管制下的市场机制,都确保了运营商的均衡价格是在有效的市场机制下形成的,所以不会出现网间结算市场失灵的情况。
The independent policy on tariffs advocates referencing the tariffs for network settlement because the tariffs are easier to obtain in terms of costs. This paper analyzes a common net settlement model from a mathematical point of view, using Nash equilibrium that under the premise of the same cost structure, increasing access costs will reduce social welfare, and come to the conclusion that each operator’s profit only with its own price And cost-related factors, but with other operators of the intranet price, inter-network price has nothing to do. Under the tariff-independent policy, operators’ profits are entirely determined by the market mechanism under the control. No matter the market is in an effective competitive state or under the control of the market mechanism, it ensures that the equilibrium price of operators is formed under an effective market mechanism, so there will be no breakdown in the online clearing market.