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1940年7月,面对日本的进逼,英国在内外压力下做出了暂时关闭滇缅公路的决定。英国在滇缅公路问题上的处理是20世纪30年代以来英国在远东对日绥靖政策的延续。然而,滇缅公路危机也是英国对日绥靖政策承上启下的关键一环。在危机中,随着形势的发展,英国政府越来越认识到英国与日本的妥协条件存在着不可逾越的鸿沟,靠一个全面的远东协议来解决两者之间的分歧既是不现实的,也是没有好处的。再加上美国对反法西斯战争支持力度的加大以及英国政府对日本战争决心和战争实力的错误估计,英国政府开始了以威慑为手段迫使日本停止或者放慢南进步伐的尝试,它明显不同于以往英国政府所采取的以妥协退让为基础的绥靖政策。
In July 1940, in the face of Japan’s intimidation, Britain made the decision to temporarily shut down the Burma Road under pressure from both inside and outside. Britain’s handling of the Burma-Burundi Highway was a continuation of Britain’s appeasement policy towards Japan in the Far East since the 1930s. However, the road crisis in Burma and Burma is also a key link in the policy of appeasement by Japan toward Japan. In the crisis, as the situation develops, the British government is increasingly realizing that there is an insurmountable gap between Britain and Japan in terms of compromise. It is both unrealistic and a matter of resolving their differences by a comprehensive Far East agreement No good. Coupled with the United States’ increased support for the anti-Fascist war and the British government’s erroneous estimation of the Japanese war’s determination and the strength of war, the British government started an attempt to force Japan to stop or slow down its pace by deterrence. The appeasement policy based on compromise and concession adopted by the British government in the past.