论文部分内容阅读
從孟子之論述見出,在我們的道德經驗中,不忍人之心所表現的同情共感或感通,實是知、情、意原本合一的道德主體的表現,並無西方哲學家之三分的說法。孟子之說明更符合我們在一般道德經驗中的真實感受。本文不但明確否决了以理性主義來詮釋儒家之義理,亦否决了以道德情操論、關懷倫理學、德行倫理學或社群主義等學理來理解儒家的倫理學。因爲,這些理論都不免在西方哲學傳統之下,分割了人類心靈或道德本心之一體性,而强爲知、情、意三分之支解,不免與道德之豐富而全面的意義有隔。
From the account of Mencius, we can see that in our moral experience, the feeling of sympathy or feeling of communication that can not stand the heart of man is a manifestation of the moral subject that is originally a unity of knowing, feeling and meaning. There is no third Points of argument. Mencius’s statement is more in line with our true feelings in the general moral experience. This article not only explicitly rejects rationalism to interpret the Confucian ethics, but also rejects the ethics of Confucianism based on the theories of moral sentiment, caring ethics, moral ethics or communitarianism. Because these theories are inevitably under the tradition of Western philosophy, the division of the unity of the human heart or morality of the heart, but strong for the knowledge, love and meaning of a third solution, can not but with the rich and comprehensive moral meanings.