Deeper Insight

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  Polling organization Gallup’s Rating World Leaders: 2019 poll on global leadership provided a sobering message to U.S. citizens accustomed to widespread respect. The median rating for U.S. global leadership in more than 130 nations stood at 31 percent, 3 percentage points behind China and just 1 percentage point above Russia.
  The U.S.’s reputation for global leadership has plummeted by 17 percentage points since Donald Trump assumed the presidency two years ago, according to Gallup, while China’s standing has edged up by 5 percentage points since Xi Jinping was elected top leader of the Communist Party of China in 2012.
  Today, the world’s two largest economies are engaged in a series of competitions around the world, from innovation in 21st-century technologies to the projection of soft power. The U.S. and China, branded a “strategic competitor” by the U.S. State Department in December 2017, are pursuing their own visions of global bridge building, both fi guratively and literally.
  Political commentators and academics have offered strong opinions about the divergent approaches of China and the U.S., but rarely are these opinions combined with a systematic methodology to analyze today’s rapid changes in global leadership.
  Yan Xuetong, Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University and one of China’s leading political scientists, presents a thorough and thought-provoking framework to analyze global power in the era of a rising China. His new book, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, analyzes the upward trajectory of China amid three decades of inconstant U.S. efforts. It is a powerful intellectual treatise worthy of serious international debate.
  Power of moral authority
  Yan sees global power as a zero-sum game. If one nation is rising, its increased influence must come at the expense of another power. No dominant nation can avoid eventual decline, whether it is the Qin Dynasty(221-206 B.C.) in China or the British Empire of Victorian times. At the close of the 20th century, the U.S. filled the vacuum caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, only to see its unipolar dominance diminish as China increased its economic strength and international ties.
  Yan’s thesis is relevant on two tracks. It explains today’s world and the evolving world of the next decade, and it creates a durable analytical methodology for studying power in international relations.
  A major difference between Yan’s paradigm and the work of most European and U.S. scholars lies in its historical underpinnings. Yan not only cites examples from Western civilization, but relies on relevant comparisons through thousands of years of Chinese history, too. Not only do we hear from Greek, Roman and German philosophers, we also get the perspectives of Chinese philosophers, ancient and modern.   Moreover, Yan does not limit his quotations to Chinese thinkers of the distant past. He liberally includes the analysis of modern Chinese intellectuals. The result is a book that is fresh and provocative. Whether you agree with Yan’s conclusions or not, he bases them on comprehensive historical analysis tempered by contemporary events.
  This book stands in sharp contrast to Harvard professor Graham Allison’s historical concept of the Thucydides trap, where the leading world power and a rising challenger inevitably careen toward military conflict. Yan’s analysis is rooted in moral authority, not military confrontation. He posits a “moral-realist theory”that attributes the rise and fall of great nations to the authority they project, not the absolute power they possess.


  In Yan’s model, China cannot chal-lenge the U.S.’s power around the world, whether military or economic, but it can dislodge the U.S. as the world’s leading power through its own increased moral authority or the U.S.’s moral decline. While economic competition will remain fi erce, Yan believes there is “only a very slight risk” of a “direct war” in the next decade.
  The mathematical formula shared by Yan is this: CC = (M+E+C)(P). In simple English, he is saying that a nation’s “comprehensive capability” to project power is equal to its military, economic and cultural power, multiplied by its political capability. Harvard University political scientist Joseph S. Nye calls this “smart power,” and Yan believes this capability can offset much of the firepower of transcontinental military alliances and intercontinental missiles.
  In Yan’s view, China benefi ts from its “effi ciency of state leadership.” (Western critics would call it unchecked central authority.) But he says China’s domestic political system cannot be replicated around the world because “Chinese communist leadership” is fundamental to the model, and the Chinese Government resolutely insists on the right of nations to determine their own political models. To succeed, China must project a moral-realist philosophy of “humane authority” rather than the class struggle philosophy espoused by Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin and Mao Zedong.
  Yan strongly believes that the early years of the 21st century marked the decline of the liberal world order that has dominated global affairs since the end of the Cold War.“There is little hope for liberalism to survive the current challenges from nonliberalist ideologies and resume its dominance as a global influence as long as Trump’s administration continues undermining the U.S.’s international reputation and leadership, and fails to grow the U.S.’s capability faster than China’s,” he writes.   U.S. leadership has veered from style to style in the past three decades. These styles, Yan writes, range from the conservative power projection of George H. W. Bush and Barack Obama to the proactive multilateralism of Bill Clinton, the aggressive interventionism of George W. Bush and the“anti-establishmentarian” aggressiveness of Trump.
  Geopolitical shifts
  Amid the rise of China, Yan argues persuasively that the world’s geopolitical center is shifting from the declining continent of Europe to the rising region of East Asia. In the absence of a hegemonic duopoly—dubbed “Chimerica” by one analyst—the world will increasingly be fractured. We are living in an “era without a dominant ideology” in “a world without mainstream values,”Yan writes.


  What comes next? Yan sees “a kaleidoscopic competition between various ideologies in different international forums.”Some predictions include: “The Middle East may be ravaged by the rivalry between Shias and Sunnis; Western countries, mainly European states, may bruise in the battle between liberalism and populism; Latin American countries may fall into intensified conflict over socialism and capitalism; many developing countries may suffer in the struggle between statism and civicism; communist countries may face contention between communism and economic pragmatism; and theocratic states may experience the tension between religion and secularism in the fi ght for political power.”
  For this reviewer, a patriotic U.S. citizen, it is diffi cult to read and painful to acknowledge the nation’s relative decline in the past two decades and the undeniable global backlash against Trumpism. If a reader accepts the idea that global power is a zero-sum game, the rise of China inevitably comes at the expense of the U.S.
  This reviewer is less certain of the inevitability of U.S. decline. A decade ago, the U.S. rebounded from signifi cant setbacks to its international reputation that took place during the presidency of George W. Bush, including the disastrous occupation of Iraq, an endless war in Afghanistan, the Wall Street meltdown in 2007 and 2008 that provoked a global fi nancial crisis, and the utopian vision of transplanting U.S.-style democracy in the Middle East and Africa.
  During Obama’s presidency, the U.S. was the most widely respected world leader by a large margin, according to Gallup polling.
  We will not know whether the collapse of U.S. moral authority during the Trump years is a temporary aberration or an irreversible decline until a new U.S. president replaces today’s controversial leader. U.S. leadership has proven durable over the past century, despite shifting leadership styles and accusations of hypocrisy.
  Yes, China is rising and the U.S. and Europe are in relative decline. However, the future is not pre-ordained. Citizens of the world must remain curious about where we are heading, and should absorb as many smart theories as possible from varied perspectives. Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers provides us with a broader and deeper understanding of our world.
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