公司治理致力于解决两类代理问题,而投资银行业代理冲突独特决定了其公司治理机制与其他行业显著不同,具体表现在:双重代理、业务非透明性及转型后的高风险性和高杠杆运营、过度依赖单一融资模式和高管薪酬激励四方面及相应的公司治理机制。我们结合研究金融危机中美国证券公司的治理问题,为中国证券行业公司治理的完善发展提供借鉴。 Corporate governance is devoted to solving two types of agency problems, while the uniqueness of the agency conflicts in investment banking determines that its corporate governance mechanism is significantly different from other industries in the following aspects: dual agency, non-transparency of business and high risk and high leverage after the transition Operation, over-reliance on a single financing model and executive compensation incentives in four areas and the corresponding corporate governance mechanism. We combine the study of the governance of U.S. securities firms in the financial crisis and provide a reference for the sound development of corporate governance in China’s securities industry.