通过构建一个有同时选择的动态博弈模型来模拟政府、保险公司、森林经营者之间的策略选择,分析政府财政补贴政策与森林保险投保行为的关系:如果政府想摆脱目前森林保险的困境,实现社会福利最大化,就必须提供政策性森林保险制度,并给予实质性的财政补贴支持。 By constructing a dynamic game model with simultaneous selection, this paper simulates the strategic choices among the government, insurance companies and forest managers, and analyzes the relationship between government fiscal subsidies and forest insurance behavior. If the government wants to get rid of the predicament of forest insurance at present, To maximize social welfare, we must provide a policy-based forest insurance system and give substantive financial subsidies.